INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 1 and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") 2 were passed in the same era-1935 and 1938, respectively-and both were intended to help the economy and workers recover from the devastation of the Great Depression. The Acts were viewed as significant governmental interventions into the employer-employee relationship. With the NLRA, Congress took a dramatic pro-worker stance, asserting that supporting workers' collective bargaining rights would balance the power dynamics in the employment relationship and help to prevent labor disputes. 3 On the other hand, in passing the FLSA, Congress did not state support for collective action; rather, its intention was to force employers to compensate workers for individual violations in wage and hour provisions to ensure workers earned enough to reinvest in the economy and boost the nation out of the
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the business class. 8 On the other hand, business interests and the wealthy, long dominant in Congress and significantly represented in the federal judiciary, 9 have not viewed the FLSA as equally threatening because the FLSA does not seek to modify the power imbalances in the workplace. Therefore, Congress has left the FLSA relatively intact, even expanding its worker protections, and courts have interpreted FLSA protections relatively liberally when compared with their treatment of the NLRA.
This Note begins by reviewing the legislative and social histories of both Acts as well as subsequent modifications to the Acts. It also contrasts interpretations of the NLRA and the FLSA in litigation, revealing how the NLRA has generally been reduced in its application and has even been used to divide workers, while the FLSA and its individual rights regime have been comparatively expanded in application. Specifically, this Note examines the courts' and the NLRB's denials of NLRA remedies and collective organizing rights to many undocumented workers 10 and temporary workers 11 and of reducing the categories of employers and associated entities 12 liable for NLRA violations and subject to union pressure. 13 Meanwhile, courts approve FLSA remedies regardless of immigration status and have expanded the application of the joint employer doctrine, ensuring that even indirect employers are held
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[Vol. 13:107 liable for FLSA violations. 14 A growing chorus of worker-friendly scholars and labor leaders, including AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka, have advocated for the scrapping the NLRA and the NLRB 15 because of the NLRA's perceived inability to assist workers organize and because of the courts' and the NLRB's willingness to use the NLRA to harm worker collective action. This Note concludes with an argument that, despite these calls, recent case law, the potentially pro-worker composition of an Obama NLRB, and Congress's consideration of the Employee Free Choice Act (a prolabor revision to the NLRA) 16 all demonstrate that important worker victories are still possible under the NLRA. Therefore the NLRA and the NLRB should be preserved. Ideally, this Note will assist creative advocates in identifying the windows of opportunity that still exist in the NLRA, which, if litigated, can unleash the power of the NLRA for workers' collective interests.
I. HISTORY AND SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATIONS OF NLRA
When Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, it intended to affirmatively alter the power disparities between workers and employers to promote the free flow of commerce. 17 It sought to do this by legalizing and encouraging workers to have collective associations-just as employers had organized for years-to increase their bargaining power. 18 Thus, the NLRA states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 14 See, e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 1998) (applying a set of wide ranging factors to find garment jobber was a joint employer of contractor's employees) . 15 See, e.g., comments of AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka, infra text accompanying note 151. 16 18 Id. ("The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . by depressing wage rates.").
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
19
Congress intended the NLRA and the NLRB to trump other federal statutes that operate in the area of labor relations and stated that the NLRA was to be "'paramount over other laws that might touch upon similar subject matters' in order to 'dispel the confusion resulting from dispersion of authority and to establish a single paramount administrative or quasi-judicial authority in connection with the development of the Federal American law regarding collective bargaining. '" 20 As legal scholar Jennifer Gordon observes, "decades of union activism . . . set the stage for the negotiation of the rights enshrined in the National Labor Relations Act." 21 The drafters of the NLRA recognized that workers gain power through collective action-individual worker action is insufficient to fulfill the NLRA's goal of altering the power imbalances at the workplace. 22 Therefore, the core protections that the NLRA conveys to workers are the right to collectively organize to demand better terms and conditions of employment and the right to engage in mutual aid and support. 23 Some of the defining features of the NLRA include the identification of a recognized union as the workers' exclusive bargaining representative, 24 protections from discharge or other disciplinary actions for workers attempting to form a union or to otherwise act concertedly regarding the terms and conditions of employment, 25 and protections from employer discrimination for union activity.
26
When originally enacted, the NLRA prohibited only employers, not workers' representatives, from engaging in certain specified "unfair labor practices." 27 Additionally, the NLRA originally allowed "closed shops," workplaces where union membership was re- 19 Id. 20 See Sachs, supra note 3, at 2685 n. 28 and did not prohibit secondary boycotts against "neutral" third parties. The NLRA was viewed by many as a nod to the increasing political power of organized workers, and a concrete step towards the balancing of workplace strength between employers and workers, or at least white workers.
29 "The NLRA embodies rights that our forebears worked and struggled for over many decades," 30 points out labor law professor Ellen J. Dannin, and "the NLRA [expresses] values of democracy, solidarity, social and economic justice, fairness, and equality." 31 Indeed, the NLRA was seen as a monumental and sweeping act that would establish the rules for an industrial democracy. 32 This, of course, is not to say that the NLRA sailed through Congress without a fight. Business-friendly congresspeople proposed numerous failed amendments to the NLRA, 33 but were able to exclude agricultural workers and domestic workers from the definition of "employee" 34 on the argument that these workers were too few in number in a single workplace to need collective representation, and were too insignificant to affect interstate commerce. 35 These categorical exclusions laid the groundwork for Congress's, the courts', and the Board's later additions to the list of workers unable to enjoy statutory protections when attempting to act collectively for improved workplace conditions.
The business class did not lay down its arms after the NLRA's passage. Just over a decade after passing the NLRA, Congress sig- 28 This closed shop status allowed workers in transient jobs such as waitressing and construction to have their primary affiliation with the union and not with the employer. See GORDON, supra note 21, at 60. This was seen as a mechanism to increase union bargaining power in those industries. See id. at 61. However, the NAACP and other civil rights groups strongly opposed the closed shop system because most unions at the time prevented Black workers from joining, and Black workers were thus excluded from those workplaces. HERBERT The Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things, prohibiting unions, and not only employers, from engaging in unfair labor practices; 38 eliminating the closed shop; 39 excluding supervisors and independent contractors from the definition of protected "employees"; 40 and prohibiting secondary boycotts against "neutral" entities that were not part of a primary labor dispute. 41 The effects of the amendments were to limit the classes of employees who could organize collectively and to outlaw important economic weapons and organizing tools available to workers. 42 As labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein explains:
Taft-Hartley advocates saw the law as a proxy for a much larger social and political project whose import extended well beyond the recalibration of the "collective bargaining" mechanism. Indeed, the Taft-Hartley law stands like a fulcrum upon which the entire New Deal order teetered. Before 1947 it was possible to imagine a continuing expansion and vitalization of the New Deal impulse. After that date, however, labor and the left were forced into an increasingly defensive posture. 43 
II. NLRB AND COURT RULINGS HAVE CONSTRICTED NLRA PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS
Congress is not the only entity to limit worker protections and narrow the definition of covered "employees" under the NLRA. Courts and the NLRB have also severely reined in NLRA protections. 44 47 and hampered the enforcement of two doctrines that impose broader liability for NLRA violations against workers (the joint employer doctrine 48 ) and allow unions to pressure more categories of employers and associated entities (the ally doctrine 49 ). In these ways, the courts and the NLRB have perverted the NLRA's original purpose-to redress the power inequalities in the workplace-by narrowing the classes of workers who are protected under the NLRA and allowing employers to pit workers against each other.
A. Narrowed Definition of NLRA-Covered "Employees"
In the 1974 decision NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc., the Supreme Court excluded "managerial" employees from NLRA coverage. 50 Managerial employees are defined as "those who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." 51 Seven years later, in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., the Court excluded "confidential" employees, defined as "persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations," from NLRA coverage. 52 Most recently, in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., the Board expanded the possible work duties that would make a worker a "supervisory" employee and thus ineligible
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for union representation. 53 These three decisions have acted as "judicial amendments" to the NLRA, 54 limiting protections for wide swaths of vulnerable workers and effectively prohibiting millions of workers from organizing together for mutual aid.
B. Restrictive Definition of Workers Eligible for Remedies and CollectiveBargaining Representation under NLRA: Undocumented Immigrants and Temporary Workers
The past two and a half decades have witnessed a striking decline in workers' collective activity because of Supreme Court and NLRB rulings limiting the types of workers who are protected and entitled to the full panoply of remedies for employer abuses under the NLRA. As demonstrated in this Part, two fast-growing categories of workers-undocumented immigrants and temporary workers-now face serious obstacles in organizing collectively with their documented and permanent coworkers.
Undocumented Immigrant Workers
The only two times that the Supreme Court has addressed the rights of undocumented immigrant workers under the NLRA were in rulings withholding NLRA remedies. 55 The Court began in 1984 in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, in which the Court, reversing the NLRB's decision, barred undocumented workers who had returned to their country of origin from collecting back pay for the time after having been illegally fired for protected union activity. 56 The Court held that the workers were not "available" for work-a requirement for back pay remedies-because they would be violating immigration laws if they were to return to the United States without being legally admitted. 57 Reinstatement with back pay, the 53 Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006) . 54 Dannin, supra note 9 (expanding on the concept of "judicial amendments" to the NLRA). (2002); but see Dannin, supra note 9 (arguing that Hoffman Plastic is only the latest in a line of Supreme Court "judicial amendments" to the NLRA-starting with NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (workers' participation in sit-down strike precluded their ability to receive NLRA remedies for employer's unfair labor practices), and Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (sailors' refusal to work, characterized as a "mutiny," precluded their ability to receive NLRA remedies for employer's unfair labor practices)-that deny NLRA remedies to workers found guilty of violating other federal or state laws while attempting to exercise their NLRA right to protected concerted activity).
56 Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 909. 57 Id. at 903.
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Court ruled, is conditioned on the ability to be "lawfully . . . present and employed in the U.S." 58 Despite emphasizing that undocumented workers are still covered as "employees" under the NLRA, 59 by restricting the remedies available to undocumented workers, the Court effectively gave the green light to employers to violate the rights of undocumented workers who had subsequently left the United States, even if their departure directly resulted from an employer-initiated immigration raid.
The Court rejected the NLRB's ruling in Sure-Tan because, while upholding the intentions of the NLRA, the Board's ruling would have required the worker to violate the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") by unlawfully reentering the country. 60 However, when Congress passed the NLRA, it intended that the NLRA would trump other statutory provisions applicable to the area of labor relations. 61 Congress also meant for the Board to administer the NLRA with only limited judicial review.
62 By denying otherwise eligible workers the remedy of back pay under the NLRA, the Court ignored congressional intent in passing the NLRA to encourage collective activity by all workers-modifying the power imbalances at the workplace-and chose instead to represent the interests of employers.
The Court then dropped a bombshell when it released its decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, which virtually eliminated the collective rights of undocumented workers under the NLRA. In that case, the Court expanded its ruling in Sure-Tan by denying reinstatement and back pay remedies to undocumented workers who had been fired for protected union activity, but had not left the United States. 63 In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), which, for the first time, made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire persons to work in the United States without proper work authorization. 64 The Court used this law to expand the Sure-Tan holding. Therefore, undocumented workers who had stayed in the United States after being illegally fired on account of their union organizing ac- 58 Id. 59 Id. at 891. 60 Id. at 903-05. 61 tivities were also "unavailable" for work, and were thus ineligible for reinstatement and back pay for the time from which they were unlawfully fired. 65 Again, by favoring the IRCA and the INA over the NLRA, 66 the Court overlooked Congress's original intent to have the NLRA be "paramount over other laws that might touch upon similar subject matters."
67 Instead of casting blame on the employer for violating the NLRA by unlawfully firing the undocumented workers-still considered "employees" under the NLRA-the Court blamed the workers for violating the IRCA. 68 Thus, the Court characterized it as a case of an "innocent" employer who unknowingly hired undocumented workers who knowingly and fraudulently presented false documents to obtain employment. In his dissent, Justice Breyer correctly recognized that having the IRCA trump the NLRA actually undermines the IRCA's express goals of preventing employer abuses of workers because it encourages employers to exploit undocumented workers even more because they know that they will not be held liable for reinstatement and back pay-two of the NLRA's most significant remedies-if they fire those workers for union activity.
69
Hoffman Plastic was a severe shock to the labor movement and advocates for immigrant worker rights. "The Hoffman Plastics case eviscerated undocumented immigrants' right to organize," argues labor law professor Jennifer Gordon.
70 "Now an employer who notes that an undocumented worker is wearing a 'Union Yes' button, or has attended a single union meeting, can rest assured that if he fires her he will never be fined a penny."
71 Indeed, the Court sent a clear message that it will not protect collective action among undocumented workers by punishing significantly an employer for 65 Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 145. 66 Id. at 149. 67 
Temporary Workers
In 2004, the NLRB further restricted the group of NLRA-covered workers in Oakwood Care Center. 72 In that case, a union petitioned for workers who were solely employed by Oakwood Care Center, an assisted living facility, along with workers who were jointly employed by Oakwood Care and a temporary staffing agency, N&W, to be included in the same bargaining unit. 73 The Board found that permitting a combined unit of solely and jointly employed employees, as the Board had previously done, 74 contravened section 9(b) of the NLRA by requiring different employers to bargain together regarding employees in the same unit. 75 The Board held that "combined units of solely and jointly employed employees are multiemployer units and are statutorily permissible only with the parties' consent." 76 This decision effectively prevents temporary workers-products of a relatively new trend of massive temporary employmentfrom having a collective bargaining agreement because, while temporary workers are still technically able to form unions, an employer of permanent workers such as Oakwood Care would likely never consent to a multiemployer unit. Therefore, the temporary workers would be forced to organize on their own, without the strength of their permanent coworkers. This division of workers in the same workplace would likely prevent the weaker temporary workers from winning a collective bargaining agreement. In their dissent, Board members Wilma Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh recognized this, writing,
The Board now effectively bars yet another group of employees-the sizeable number of workers in alternative work arrangements-from organizing labor unions, by making them get their employers' permission first. The dissent also correctly noted that the majority's refusal to place the workers in the same bargaining unit harms the permanent workers employed directly by Oakwood Care because, when attempting to organize for better wages and working conditions, they can be pitted against the temporary workers who are barred from organizing with them.
78
These recent Supreme Court and NLRB decisions splinter workers with common interests, further undermining the purposes of the NLRA. While undocumented workers and temporary workers are still covered "employees" under the NLRA, their practical abilities to organize with their coworkers have been severely limited.
C. Restrictive Definitions of Liable Employers and Employer-Associated Entities Subject to Union Pressure under NLRA
In addition to reducing the classes of workers eligible for certain NLRA remedies, courts and the NLRB have limited the range of employers liable for NLRA violations as well as the categories of employers and associated entities that unions may legally pressure during organizing campaigns. Specifically, the Board and the circuit courts of appeals have (1) shrunk the categories of employers that can be held jointly responsible for NLRA violations (i.e. joint employers), 79 and (2) limited the application of the ally doctrine 80 pursuant to which third parties can be found to be "allies" of an employer in its anti-union campaign, and thus not protected by the NLRA secondary boycott prohibition. 81 These actions by the Board and courts further divide workers and contravene the express intent of the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining. 77 Id. at 663-64 (Liebman, M., and Walsh, M., dissenting) (quoting NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. §159(b)). 78 Id. . 81 Unions sometimes attempt to pressure other entities associated with the primary employer, so that those associated entities will in turn pressure the primary employer to negotiate with the union. However, NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006), known as the "secondary boycott" provision, prohibits a union from exerting such pressure on a entity with which the union does not have a labor dispute.
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Joint Employer Doctrine
The NLRB has generally applied a narrow definition of "joint employers," limiting the types of de facto employers that can be held liable for NLRA violations. 82 In TLI, Inc., 83 the NLRB set the current standard for determining joint employer status. The Board wrote, "where two separate entities share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment, they are to be considered joint employers for purposes of the Act." 84 The Board added, "there must [also] be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction." 85 In applying these relatively formalistic factors 86 that recognize only direct and immediate employment relationships, the Board has been explicit in rejecting the joint employer test previous to TLI, which also recognized indirect employment relationships.
87
The narrow NLRA joint employer factors fail to take into account complex nontraditional forms of employment, especially in the growing area of subcontracting. In a 1991 case, Southern California Gas Co., the NLRB affirmed an administrative law judge's ruling that a building management company that fired a union cleaning contractor on account of anti-union animus was not liable for the workers' unlawful discharge because it was not a joint employer.
88
Decisions like this have helped to give employers that subcontract services immunity from liability for unfair labor practices committed against workers in union drives, tipping the playing field even more in favor of employers. 89 82 A common joint employer arrangement works as follows: an employer contracts out services but effectively controls the terms and conditions of employment for the contractor's employees. 83 
Ally Doctrine
The ally doctrine is an exception to the NLRA secondary boycott prohibition. Under the ally doctrine, an entity loses its NLRA section 8(b)(4) secondary boycott protection as a neutral third party when it enmeshes itself in anti-union activities against the primary employer's workers. 90 However, the federal courts have limited the classes of primary employers and associated entities that may be susceptible to union pressure by narrowly interpreting the ally doctrine. In SEIU Local 525 v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit held that certain third parties cannot be held liable for anti-union activities as allies of employers. 91 In that case, the union argued that the landlords and tenants of a building whose cleaning contractor the union was attempting to organize were allies of the contractor because they had enmeshed themselves in the labor dispute by actively supporting the contractor's anti-union campaign. 92 The union thus posited that the landlord and tenants were not covered by the prohibition against secondary pressures and that the union's picketing was not unlawfully targeting the landlord and tenants as neutral third parties. 93 The court, however, ruled that the landlord and tenants were not the contractor's allies because, under the ally doctrine, the putative ally must either be performing struck work for the primary employer or must "fall into the category of those who, because of common ownership, control and integration of operations, become so identified with the primary employer that they are treated as a single enterprise." 94 These narrow factors are similar to the formalistic factors for NLRA joint employment under TLI, Inc., further demonstrating the refusal of the courts and the Board to impose employer liability or allow unions to pressure employer-associated entities under the NLRA unless a very limited set of factors are satisfied.
Because of the subsequent legislative distortions of the NLRA and the federal court and NLRB limitations on the NLRA's ability to protect workers' collective action, the NLRA and the NLRB no longer accurately reflect Congress's original intention to address power imbalances in the workplace. Jennifer Gordon argues that "interpreted against the interests of workers by generations of con- with author) . However, the definitions of "employee" are different precisely because Congress, the courts, and the NLRB have made them so, arguably to preclude workers' collective activity which business interests find more threatening than individual worker attempts to vindicate substantive rights. As for retrospective versus prospective relief, that is simply the nature of the statutes, and, while courts may find it easier to only calculate and impose retrospective relief, it is virtually impossible to do so while carrying out the purposes of the NLRA.
Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles
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are still enforced. In fact, FLSA rights have been expanded over the years, partially because they can distract individual workers from acting collectively to increase worker power. 99 While the NLRA contains procedural rights "essential to any effort to raise wages and improve working conditions beyond the minimums prescribed by law," the FLSA contains substantive rights that "set basic floors on workplace conditions." 100 Business interests figure that it is less dangerous for individual workers to fight for minimum rights that are already statutorily guaranteed than it is for workers to fight collectively to co-determine, along with their employers, the terms and conditions of their employment. This is not to say that employers have not fought vigorously against FLSA protections-they have. 101 However, relatively speaking, employers are more comfortable with the FLSA than with the NLRA.
102
Nowhere in the preamble of the FLSA does Congress state an intention, as it does in the NLRA, to encourage workers to act collectively to address the inequities in the workplace. 103 Instead, the congressional intent was to address "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers," and to support the "free flow of goods in commerce" by preventing labor 
124
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:107 disputes. 104 These are all ideals that most people can support, if not morally, then at least on a model of economic efficiency-welltreated workers are more productive and well-paid workers spend more money to boost the national economy. Significantly, the FLSA does not seek to empower workers to address the power imbalances that lead to exploitation in the first place.
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 with the support of unions, child advocates, and other parts of civil society. 105 Much of the focus of the FLSA was on eliminating child labor and the unfair competition that Southern employers gave Northern employers because of the dearth of wage and hour regulations in the South.
106
Getting a fair labor bill passed despite the opposition of the conservative anti-New Deal Supreme Court was also a personal goal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 107 The final version of the FLSA, passed in 1938, applied to only about one-fifth of the labor force. 108 It banned oppressive child labor and set a minimum hourly wage of 25 cents and a maximum workweek of 44 hours.
109
It is worth noting that the FLSA originally excluded many groups of workers, including employees of certain retail establishments, 110 employees of common air carriers, 111 all agricultural workers, 112 bus drivers and other trolley and bus company employees, 113 and food packing and dairy workers 114 from minimum wage and overtime pay regulations.
As opposed to its treatment of the NLRA, Congress has generally expanded and extended FLSA protections to individual workers over the years. While the FLSA originally excluded more categories of workers than the NLRA, the statutes have now switched, with the NLRA now excluding more types of workers than the FLSA. Congress has repealed all of the worker exclusions in the FLSA except for those dealing with certain farm workers.
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In 1966, Congress extended FLSA coverage to workers in public schools, nursing homes, laundries, and the entire construction industry. 116 In 1974, domestic workers obtained coverage under the FLSA, as did all state and local government employees.
117 Congress also added the "hot goods" provision to the FLSA, making it illegal to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell any goods produced in violation of minimum wage or overtime pay laws.
118 Despite the general trend of expanding FLSA coverage over the years, Congress and the Department of Labor have also restricted it for certain groups of workers.
119 Furthermore, Congress has only voted to raise the minimum wage nine times since the FLSA's enactment in 1938. 120 But while the FLSA has been no panacea for workers' rights, it has remained relatively true to Congress's original intention of providing a baseline of substantive workplace rights, especially when compared to the NLRA.
IV. SIGNIFICANT COURT RULINGS HAVE EXPANDED APPLICATION OF FLSA
Federal courts have also generally augmented FLSA remedies for workers and have expanded the classes of employers liable under the FLSA. As described in this Part, courts have expressly ruled that undocumented immigrant workers are eligible for FLSA remedies, as opposed to NLRA remedies. And courts have liberally applied the joint employer doctrine under the FLSA, while restricting its application under the NLRA.
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A. Undocumented Immigrant Workers Eligible for FLSA Remedies
As opposed to remedies prescribed by the NLRA, courts have almost always upheld FLSA remedies for workers regardless of their immigration status. 121 The Hoffman Plastic holding denying back pay remedies to undocumented workers has been limited to cases adjudicated under the NLRA, despite early fears that it may be applied to other statutes. 122 In a 2002 case, Flores v. Amigon,
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the Eastern District of New York ruled that immigration status is not relevant to a FLSA claim for unpaid wages for work that a bakery worker had already performed. The court reasoned that "unlike the problem posed in Hoffman Plastic in which an illegal alien was wrongfully terminated from employment and could not be legally reinstated, . . . here no such impediment exists to repayment of any amounts proved to be owed to plaintiff for work that she already performed." 124 This holding typifies federal courts' willingness to recognize undocumented workers as eligible for remedies under the FLSA. In many industries such as the garment industry, a system of contracting exists where manufacturers-typically well-known brands-contract out the production of their goods to avoid responsibility for the labor-intensive assembly stage of production.
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In the garment industry, the manufacturers dictate to the contractors the price per piece, the turnover time for the items, and the exact specifications of the finished products.
127 Often, the contractors-usually small, family-run operations-violate FLSA wage and hour laws, then close up and disappear, leaving large groups of unpaid or underpaid workers. 128 The manufacturers then disclaim responsibility for the FLSA violations committed by the contractors. 129 In response, and in contrast to the shrinking employer coverage under the NLRA, 130 courts have expanded the FLSA's definition of joint employers to impose liability on the manufacturers for violations committed against the workers by the contractors.
Although it has a long history in the agricultural industry, (1) the extent to which the workers perform a discrete line-job forming an integral part of the putative joint employer's integrated process of production or overall business objective; (2) whether the putative joint employer's premises and equipment were used for the work; (3) the extent of the putative employees' work for the putative joint employer;
A year later began the decade-long saga of Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel, where 26 garment workers sued a garment manufacturer for FLSA violations committed by the contractor. 134 The case was appealed to the Second Circuit, which rejected a formalistic approach to the employment relationship-the analysis that courts and the NLRB embrace in determining joint employer status under the NLRA-when determining whether an entity is a joint employer under the FLSA. 135 The court wrote, "[t]he broad language of the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . demands that a district court look beyond an entity's formal right to control the physical performance of another's work before declaring that the entity is not an employer under the FLSA." 136 The court found the four narrow factors establishing a formal employment relationship 137 to be sufficient but not essential in finding joint employer status.
138 It then named a set of six factors 139 -factors narrower than those named in Lopez but still expansive compared to the formalistic joint employer standard under the NLRA-to determine joint employer (4) the permanence or duration of the working relationship between the workers and the putative joint employer; (5) the degree of control exercised by the putative joint employer over the workers; (6) whether responsibility under the contract with the putative joint employer passed "without material changes" from one group of potential joint employees to another; and (7) whether the workers had a "business organization" that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another. Id In early 2009, the Southern District of New York denied a motion to set aside a jury award for garment workers, holding that Liberty Apparel, the manufacturer, was a joint employer and thus jointly liable for the FLSA violations committed by its contractors. 141 This groundbreaking outcome will likely lead to the further expansion of the joint employer doctrine under the FLSA.
As demonstrated by the above analysis, Congress and courts have generally upheld or expanded FLSA coverage of workers and of employers. Meanwhile, they have reduced NLRA protections for workers and liabilities for employers. It is likely that this conflicting application of the two statutory regimes is due to the fact that the FLSA does not seek to challenge the power imbalance at the workplace that underlies the market economy.
V. NLRA STILL CONTAINS SEEDS OF PROMISE
Despite the systematic dismantling of the NLRA over the years and suggestions that the NLRA is impotent or even anti-worker, 142 the NLRA is still a powerful statutory regime supporting worker unity and collective action, as demonstrated by recent court and Board decisions. 143 Additionally, President Barack Obama has appointed a pro-labor majority to the Board 144 and Congress is considering the Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA"), 145 a proposed overhaul of the NLRA that would strengthen its ability to promote worker unity. 146 As 163 and could eventually include prohibitions on employer "captive audience" meetings 164 and mandated union organizer access to worksites.
165
All of these features would serve as counterbalances to Congress's anti-union modifications to the NLRA in decades past. Despite their optimism, labor advocates cannot rely solely on the promise of a worker-friendly NLRB and a pro-union overhaul of the NLRA. Even under the Obama administration and with a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress, unions have not authorized representative when a simple majority of its employees sign cards authorizing the union to serve as the employees' exclusive representative. Currently, an employer is not required to recognize a union when presented with authorization cards signed by a majority of its employees; instead, it may request a secret ballot union election. Such a secret ballot election gives an employer time to campaign against the union, oftentimes by threatening employees with termination or plant closure if the union wins. . 18, 2010) . 164 The term "captive audience meeting" refers to a mandatory meeting held to oppose a union campaign during which an employer typically inundates employees with anti-union propaganda. See American Rights at Work, Unionbusters 101, http:// www.americanrightsatwork.org/the-anti-union-network/for-profit-union-busters/ unionbusters-101.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). An employer may choose to hold as many of these meetings as it wishes (except for the 24 hour period before the union authorization election administered by the NLRB 
